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IN PRAISE OF AWKWARDNESS: KADI IN THE CJEU 
 
                            ‘A great one gave me charge. I must’ 
       Ibsen Brand 
The European Court of Justice and the United Nations blacklisting regime – 
Background, case-law and conflict in relation to that regime – The Kadi II case – 
wider constitutional dimensions of the ruling – theoretical aspects of the dispute from 
rule of law perspective – the future 
INTRODUCTION  
Once upon a time it was taken for granted that if you committed yourself to 
the ‘Rule of Law’ and the protection of ‘Fundamental Human Rights’ you were 
embracing values that were of necessity, and by definition, universal.  The first 
of these applied to all without fear or favour while the beneficiaries of the 
second qualified through their species-membership rather than through any 
additional feature they might have been required to have (nationality; religion; 
gender; etc.), however deep such an extra might be thought to be. Of course 
this equality has always been to some extent mocked in practice: the police 
beat up some guys and not others, and get away with it; the trials of some (but 
not others) are travesties of justice; protestors judged legitimate are protected 
by the authorities while others not so lucky can’t get a room for their meetings 
and are arrested if they meet outside.  The history of civil liberties across the 
democratic polities that emerged at the start of the last century and then 
fought hot and cold wars with their enemies until 1989 is in many ways the 
story of this mismatch between what a place told itself it was doing and what 
was happening in practice.1  In those days stuff tended to take place beyond 
the law, or shabbily disguised in bad legal dress if it happened to come to 
public light.  The real stories on freedom and liberty belonged on the streets 
not in the courtroom; this was where power did what was required away from 
the gaze of law and certainly not under its shelter. There is a virtue in such 
                                                          
1
  See for one jurisdiction J. Mahoney, Civil Liberties in Britain during the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) and K. D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), and - more generally - for a contemporary account that reflects in its critique these 
widespread assumptions of the past: V. V. Ramraj, M. Hor, K. Roach and G.Williams eds, Global Anti-Terrorism 
Law and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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hypocrisy – it reinforces the importance of values by the covert way in which it 
seeks to circumvent them. 
What has been happening since the end of the Cold War, and particularly since 
the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, has been 
different to what has gone before. On the one hand, the primacy of law and of 
human rights protection (which has gathered such momentum in recent 
decades as rivals to liberal constitutionalism have fallen away) has meant that 
pretty well all of us now all have written documents with bills of rights, 
independent judges and guarantees of protection against state power - and 
these are not designed to be merely obviously decorative (as in the past) but 
are supposed to bite in an American, Bill-of-rights-kind of way.2  Law is more 
pervasive than it was, the niches of law-free executive power fewer and 
fewer.3 On the other hand, what we mean by ‘the Rule of Law’ and ‘the 
protection of Fundamental Human Rights’ has been subject to intense 
challenge.  Arguably always less secure than might have been rather 
complacently assumed, the universalism of both human rights and the rule of 
law can no longer be simply taken for granted.4  We are being invited to leave 
a world where denying human rights and fair legal procedures to all is evidence 
of hypocrisy, and enter one where such double-standards are what the terms 
actually in their essence entail.5  The underlying meaning of what it means to 
believe in these ideas is being directly challenged, and not by this or that 
dictatorship nostalgic for better times (albeit by those too of course) but – 
mainly and critically – by the very states whose democratic revolutions gave us 
these universal meanings in the first place.6  Standing in their way in Europe 
are a few unelected judges from an entity that cannot even call itself a state 
without risking terminal offence.  It is an heroic story - whether a last ditch 
stand or the beginning of a glorious fight-back we cannot yet tell, but in the 
                                                          
2
  Oxford Constitutions of the World,  http://oxcon.ouplaw.com/ (password protected),  gives a taste of the 
range (visited 14 January 2014). 
3
  For a powerful statement about the pervasive relevance of law see D. Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
4
  See generally C. A. Gearty, Can Human Rights Survive? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
5
  For a strong critique of human rights as a kind of charade see I. Manokha, The Political Economy of Human 
Rights Enforcement (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
6
  The broader story, and also a full version of this argument, is to be found in C. A. Gearty, Liberty and Security 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
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meantime what we can do is celebrate how seriously these men and women 
take their vocation. 
HYPOCRISY AND HEROISM 
On 17 October 2001, Yasin Abdullah Kadi was ‘identified as being an individual 
associated with Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network.’7 This was bad 
news for Mr Kadi because after the attacks on the US by this network the 
month before, the United Nations had greatly broadened the reach of its 
sanctions regime, to cover more and more suspects. The various Security 
Council resolutions in place provided ‘for the freezing of assets of the 
organisations, entities and persons identified by the committee established by 
the Security Council in accordance with resolution 1267 (1999) of 15 October 
1999 (‘the Sanctions Committee’) on a consolidated list (‘the Sanctions 
Committee Consolidated List’).8  Because of the way he was implicated with Al-
Qaeda, Kadi got put on this list.  
European regional action followed almost immediately. The EU already 
had its own sanctions system in place, and on 19 October 2001 Kadi was 
‘added to the list in Annex 1 to Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 of 6 
March 2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to 
Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds 
and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan…’.9  
When the legal basis for the EU sanctions changed about six months later, he 
also found his way onto the new list ‘imposing certain specific restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama 
bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban’.10 By then Mr Kadi – who 
had presumably been finding his life suddenly narrowing all around him – had 
already instituted legal proceedings. He wanted all these EU regulations 
annulled ‘in so far as [they] concerned him’ on the basis that they ‘were, 
respectively, infringement of the right to be heard, the right to respect for 
                                                          
7
  Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 18 July 2013 in Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P, C-595/10 P European 
Commission, Council of the European Union  and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi, not yet officially reported, para. 16 [Kadi II]. 
8
  Ibid. para. 6. 
9
  Ibid, para. 17. 
10
  Ibid. para. 17. The relevant legislative was Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002.  
4 
 
property and the principle of proportionality, and also of the right to effective 
judicial review’.11 
 What happened next will be a central part of the foundation story of the 
new EU if it makes it securely into the first few hundred years of the current 
Millennium.  First his action is dismissed: the UN rules, said the General Court. 
Therefore, short of the extreme situation of a violation of jus cogens (not the 
case here), the Security Council can do what it wants, immune from the 
procedural tribulations that affect lesser bodies.12 Then, en route to the Grand 
Chamber, along came the Advocate General Maduro who in a simple opinion 
resonant with the human rights and rule-of-law traditions of the EU 
transformed the atmosphere by suggesting that whatever about the UN, the 
EU simply couldn’t do what it liked (jus cogens apart) to people within its 
jurisdiction simply because another international organisation (albeit a 
powerful one) seemed to require it to.13 The relevant English cliché to deploy 
at this point is ‘cat among the pigeons’.  
The Grand Chamberof the Court of Justice backed the cat, in ‘essence’ 
holding ‘that the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot 
have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty, 
which include the principle that all European Union acts must respect 
fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness 
which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of 
legal remedies established by that treaty.’14 It followed, as the judgment made 
crystal clear ‘that the Courts of the European Union must ensure the review, in 
principle the full review, of the lawfulness of all European Union acts in the 
light of fundamental rights, including where such acts are designed to 
implement Security Council resolutions, and that the General Court’s reasoning 
was consequently vitiated by an error of law’.15 
 This decision was issued on 3 September 2008.  The immediate problem 
of course was what to do with Mr Kadi. The Court gave some hints about how 
                                                          
11
  Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 18. 
12
  Case T-315/01 Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3649 [Kadi I]. 
13
  Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-402/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities 16 January 2008. 
14
  Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 22. 
15
  Ibid, para. 23. 
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best to proceed  - Kadi needed to have the grounds behind his listing 
communicated to him and should, as well, have an ‘opportunity to be heard in 
that regard’.16  This should have happened ‘as swiftly as possible’17 after the 
listing – but better late than never.  The Council was given three months to 
sort things out, during which time the annulled regulation would be 
maintained.   
There then began the usual sort of search for a compromise that has 
become a familiar part of the counter-terrorism response to inconvenient 
judicial interventions.  Removal of the whole framework of control is never 
considered. Invariably the ‘compromise’ that is achieved shifts the law firmly 
onto the side of civil libertarian restriction, with new structures of executive 
power underpinning explicit controls on freedom, all backed by ostensible but 
invariably tawdry safeguards of a sort that would have been deplored as 
unthinkable only a decade or so before.18 Thus Guantanamo detentions have 
survived a succession of Supreme Court interventions and emerged at the 
other end protected by a second-rate due process which gives the illusion of 
fairness but not any kind of substance of a sort that would until quite recently 
have been thought essential.19  In the same way, and to pick another well-
known story from the common law world, indefinite detention of suspected 
international terrorists in the UK has been replaced by an intricate web of 
Terrorism Prevention Investigation Measures (or TPIMs) which themselves had 
succeeded control orders after a bout of wrangling between the legislative and 
executive branches.20 These also fail to deliver any kind of due process as that 
term has been traditionally understood.  In each of these examples the 
impugned counter-terrorist initiative has survived challenge, been 
strengthened even, by taking on the shape of a fully legal procedure, despite – 
on closer examination – revealing itself as lacking in the fundamentals of what 
we have historically meant by fair play.21 Having deployed their trump cards 
                                                          
16
  Ibid, para. 24. 
17
  Ibid, para. 24. 
18
  Gearty supra, n. 6 goes into the detail. 
19
  F. de Londras, Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011). 
20
  For a taste of the law see the report by the UK Government’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation, D. Anderson QC, Control Orders. Final Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act 2005 (London: The Stationery office, 2012). 
21
 Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (UK).  
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the courts in both these jurisdictions have felt it opportune to show some good 
manners and withdraw from the fray. 
 The Kadi story seemed initially to be going along the same route. The UN 
sanctions regime had already been shedding bits of its draconian nature even 
before the 2008 ruling.  A ‘focal point’ within the Security Council had been 
established in March 2007 as somewhere for those affected by these decisions 
to turn, especially if they were minded to try to get off the list.22  This was 
helped by a decision made at around the same time that States suggesting 
additions to the list must provide a ‘statement of case’ which should ‘provide 
as much detail as possible on the basis(es) for the listing, including (i) specific 
information supporting a determination that the individual or entity meets the 
criteria …; (ii) the nature of the information; and (iii) supporting information or 
documents that can be provided.’23  States were also asked at the same time to 
identify bits of their statements that they would be comfortable passing on to 
the listed entity and any other parts that they might show interested States on 
request.24   
In June 2008 the publicity element was ratcheted up a bit, with a new 
obligation being imposed on the Sanctions Committee to make accessible on 
its website ‘a narrative summary of reasons for listing’ decisions.25  Then after 
Kadi in September 2008, a new functionary emerged, not a judge or other 
independent decision-making body of course, but rather an ‘Ombudsperson … 
of high moral character, impartiality and integrity with high qualifications and 
experience in relevant fields’26 whose job it now was to assist the Sanctions 
Committee in relation to delisting requests. As envisaged in the relevant 
Resolution, this involved a lot of information gathering, consultation, hand-
holding of the appealing party, the preparation for the Sanctions Committee of 
a ‘comprehensive report’ and assisting that body in its determinations – but no 
independent decision-making authority.27 In the Summer of 2011 the 
requirement that there be unanimity on the Sanctions Committee before a 
delisting takes effect was removed, and at the same time the opportunity was 
                                                          
22
  UN Security Council Resolution 1730 (2006) of 19 December 2006. 
23
  UN Security Council Resolution 1735 (2006) of 22 December 2006, para. 5. 
24
  UN Security Council Resolution 1735 (2006) of 22 December 2006, para. 6. 
25
  UN Security Council Resolution 1822 (2008) of 30 June 2008, para. 13. 
26
  UN Security Council Resolution 1904 (2009) of 17 December 2009, para. 20. 
27
  Ibid, annex 2 has the details. 
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taken to make further procedural tweaks so as to give the Ombudsperson a 
somewhat stronger grip on procedures, albeit without yet securing any kind of 
original decision-making power.28 
 So far as Mr Kadi himself was concerned, on 21 October 2008 a narrative 
summary of reasons for his listing was duly produced by the Sanctions 
Committee and sent to him.  This contained many very damaging assertions 
about his role both as a banker working closely with and part-funded by Usama 
bin Laden and also as someone deeply implicated in terrorism, one who 
‘funnelled money to extremists’ and (even) in one of whose premises 
‘[p]lanning sessions for an attack against a United States facility in Saudi Arabia 
may have taken place’29 – no details of course and note the ‘may’. There was 
much deeply prejudicial assertion of culpability along these lines.  Mr Kadi 
responded by asking to see the evidence, asserting that none of what was said 
about his terrorist-inclinations was true and ‘whenever he had been given the 
opportunity to express his point of view on the evidence said to inculpate him, 
he had been able to demonstrate that the allegations made against him were 
unfounded.’30 This cut no ice with the Commission officials.  Kadi duty duly 
discharged, the listing was confirmed on 28 November 2008.31  
AGAINST THE ODDS 
Back Mr Kadi went to court, arguing - hardly surprisingly - that the process 
which he had undergone since his legal victory could hardly be described as 
the kind of ‘full review’ that the Grand Chamber had had in mind. The General 
Court agreed.32 It was ‘obvious’ that it had been the intention of that court 
that ‘judicial review, in principle full review, should extend not only to the 
apparent merits of the contested measure but also to the evidence and 
information on which the findings made in that measure are based.’33  By citing 
Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran v Council in its decision,34 the 
General Court expressed confidence that the Court in Kadi had ‘approved and 
endorsed the standard and intensity of judicial review determined in that 
                                                          
28
  UN Security Council Resolution 1989 (2011) of 17 June 2011. 
29
  Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 28 for the full summary. 
30
  Ibid, para. 31. 
31
  Commission Regulation (EC) 1190/2008 (28 November 2008). 
32
  Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission  [2010] ECR II - 5177 (30 September 2010). 
33
  This is how the Grand Chamber put it in Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 40. 
34
  [2006] ECR II - 4665: see Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 41. 
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judgment, namely that the Courts of the European Union must review the 
assessment made by the institution concerned of the facts and circumstances 
relied on in support of the restrictive measures at issue and determine 
whether the information and evidence on which that assessment is based is 
accurate, reliable and consistent, and such review cannot be barred on the 
ground that that information and evidence is secret or confidential’.  With 
dicta like this there could only be one winner. The Commission was sent back 
to the drawing board. 
 Before going there however the authorities rolled their final dice, an 
appeal to the Grand Chamber. All the big beasts weighed in. The Commission 
took a case, as did the Council. Ever-vigilant in the field of counter-terrorism, 
so did the United Kingdom.  All wanted the judgment set aside and an order 
for costs against Mr Kadi.  They were supported by a dozen or so Member 
States with over fifty names appearing among the lawyers assigned 
responsibility to win the appeal. Against them, five UK-based lawyers were left 
to argue Kadi’s point of view.35  
A line taken by some of the appellant and intervening parties was that 
the first Kadi decision had been ill-considered and should now be disregarded.  
The Court was unsurprisingly unsympathetic, swatting away arguments that 
had been rejected in that earlier decision.  The case-law was now entirely clear 
that ‘European Union measures implementing restrictive measures decided at 
international level enjoy no immunity from jurisdiction’36 and that, ‘without 
the primacy of a Security Council resolution at the international level thereby 
being called into question, the requirement that the European Union 
institutions should pay due regard to the institutions of the United Nations 
must not result in there being no review of the lawfulness of such European 
Union measures, in the light of the fundamental rights which are an integral 
part of the general principles of European Union law.’37 As for the substance of 
the human rights themselves, the Court resisted the opportunity offered it by 
the scores of government and EU lawyers before it to dilute the level of 
                                                          
35
  David Vaughan QC, Vaughan Lowe QC, James Crawford SC, Maya Lester and Professor Piet Eeckhout.   
36
  Not only Kadi I, supra  n. 12, but now also Joined Cases C-399/06 P and C-403/06 P Hassan and Ayadi v 
Council and Commission [2009] ECR I - 11393 and Case C-548/09 P of 16 November 2011 Bank Melli Iran v 
Council.  
37
  Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 67. 
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procedural safeguards upon which Mr Kadi could rely - in other words, to 
restrict Kadi I in a way that ignored at least its spirit and possibly also (though 
not implausibly so) the actual words used in that ruling.  There were to be no 
double standards so far as fairness in the EU was concerned. 
 The Grand Chamber achieved this outcome, startlingly at odds with all 
the parties before it except Mr Kadi, and in defiance as well of the United 
Nations institutions (of which, of course, the judges could hardly have been 
unaware). It did so by the simple but highly effective device of taking the 
rhetoric of human rights seriously.  This is what marks the decision as different 
from those in national jurisdictions (some already referred to38) where the 
courts settle for less after a brief blaze of civil libertarian defiance.  The judges 
were obliged ‘in accordance with the powers conferred on them by the 
Treaties’ to ‘ensure the review, in principle the full review, of the lawfulness of 
all Union acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of 
the European Union legal order’. Quite naturally (indeed inevitably), this 
‘included review of such measures as are designed to give effect to resolutions 
adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations …’.39 This obligation was ‘expressly laid down by the second paragraph 
of Article 275 TFEU.’40 The fundamental rights guaranteed in this way included 
‘respect for the rights of the defence and the right to effective judicial 
protection’.41 The first of these included ‘the right to be heard and the right to 
have access to the file, subject to legitimate interests in maintaining 
confidentiality’,42 while the second (‘affirmed in Article 47 of the Charter’43) 
required ‘that the person concerned must be able to ascertain the reasons 
upon which the decision taken in relation to him is based, either by reading the 
decision itself or by requesting and obtaining disclosure of those reasons, 
without prejudice to the power of the court having jurisdiction to require the 
authority concerned to disclose that information, so as to make it possible for 
him to defend his rights in the best possible conditions and to decide, with full 
knowledge of the relevant facts, whether there is any point in his applying to 
                                                          
38
  See text at nn. 18-21 and Ramraj, Hor, Roach and Williams, supra n. 1. 
39
  Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 97, citing Hassan and Ayadi v Council and Commission, supra n. 34, para. 71 and 
Bank Melli Iran v Council, supra n. 34, para. 105. 
40
  Kadi II, supra  n.  7, para. 97.   
41
  Ibid, para. 98.   
42
  Ibid, para. 99. 
43
  Ibid, para. 100. 
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the court having jurisdiction, and in order to put the latter fully in a position to 
review the lawfulness of the decision in question’.44 
 Phrased like this, it would have made no difference if all EU states had 
joined the case or pooled their resources to secure the best advocate in the 
world: there could only be one winner. The Court pointed out that Mr Kadi had 
got stuck on the list in the first place because the US had decided as early as 12 
October 2001 (through something called an Office of Foreign Asset Control) 
that he was a ‘Specially Designated Global Terrorist’.45 It was this that had 
produced the UN action which in due course had generated the summary of 
reasons upon which the EU had to rely in terms of??, having nothing apart 
from that to go on.46 His family and working life had been turned upside down 
and he had suffered the ‘public opprobrium and suspicion’ which such 
measures as these inevitable provoke.47  
Kadi had been rolling about in this echo chamber of insinuation and 
innuendo for nearly twelve years, but as every criminal lawyer learns early in 
law school the repetition of an allegation multiple times does not make it more 
true. Where was the ‘sufficiently solid factual basis’48 to explain Kadi’s 
elevation to this role of ‘global terrorist’? The European judges needed this 
even if no one else could care less, because their law required that they check 
whether the ‘reasons [given], or at the very least one of those, deemed 
sufficient in itself to support that decision, [was] substantiated’.49 The final 
sections of the judgment are a devastating critique, allegation by allegation, of 
the unsubstantiated nature of the claims that had led to the listing of the 
applicant.50  If security requires secrecy, then that could easily have been 
arranged: there were available to be deployed by the court various ‘techniques 
which accommodate on the one hand, legitimate security considerations about 
the nature and sources of information taken into account in the adoption of 
the act concerned and, on the other, the need sufficiently to guarantee to an 
                                                          
44
  Ibid, para. 100. 
45
  Ibid, para. 109. 
46
  Ibid, para. 110. 
47
  Ibid, para. 132. 
48
  Ibid, para. 119. 
49
  Ibid, para. 119. 
50
  Ibid, paras. 151-162. There were some differences as between the General Court and Grand Chamber on 
the right approach where the EU institutions do not have the evidential base for decisions it is taking: see ibid, 
paras. 138-150. It was this that led the Grand Chamber to its detailed assessment. 
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individual respect for his procedural rights, such as the right to be heard and 
the requirement for an adversarial process.’51 But none of this had been 
suggested as a route out of the impasse. True, the UN system had improved 
since Kadi had been listed but still fell far short of what EU law required.52 The 
appeal was dismissed with costs. 
 Nowhere is Kadi’s nationality mentioned. Who is this Yasin Aabdullah 
Ezzedine Kadi? He was born in Cairo Egypt in 1955 but is described by the EU 
Commission as a Saudi Arabian national.53 If we are to believe the web he 
appears to have trained as an architect in Egypt after which he moved to 
Chicago. He is (or perhaps was) extremely wealthy, has ties to the Saudi royal 
family, and became involved in banking in the 1990s. He would seem also to 
have been associated with the Moslem Brotherhood, a very strong opponent 
of the Egyptian regime then headed by Hosni Mubarak whose primary 
paymaster was the United States and with whose security apparatus he would 
have had very close links, not least in his role as the region’s most important 
Arab defender of Israeli interests.54 The 2001 designation sparked a range of 
actions against Kadi and his financial interests around the world.55 Intriguingly, 
he had disappeared from the sanctions list some months before the Grand 
Chamber ruling:56 Kadi had escaped the echo chamber before it could be 
explained to him why he had been there.  
The issue remains an important one though because the United Nations 
can hardly afford to have a rival source of authority occupying a substantial 
part of the world, rejecting its authority. There will be future cases like that of 
Mr Kadi for whom delisting will not be judged possible. The Court addresses 
this in an obscure couple of paragraphs well into the substance of its ruling: 
                                                          
51
  Ibid, para. 125, explained further at paras. 126-129.  
52
  Ibid, para. 133. 
53
  See Commission Regulation (EC) No 1190/2008 of 28 November 2008 
 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Notice.do?mode=dbl&lang=en&ihmlang=en&lng1=en,en&lng2=bg,cs,da,de,el,en,es,et,fi,fr,hu,it,
lt,lv,mt,nl,pl,pt,ro,sk,sl,sv,&val=483959:cs  , visited 10 January 2014. 
54
  The Brotherhood enjoyed a brief period in power in Egypt after the ‘Arab Spring’ before a military coup 
ended the country’s experiment with democracy, albeit now without Mubarak: see A. Shatz, ‘Egypt’s Counter-
Revolution’ London Review of Books, 16 August 2013:  http://www.lrb.co.uk/blog/2013/08/16/adam-
shatz/egypts-counter-revolution/ last visited 12 January 2014. 
55
  There is an enormous amount of detail at http://911research.wikia.com/wiki/Yasin_al-Qadi , last visited 10 
January 2014. 
56
  On 5 October 2012: UN Security Council SC/10785: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10785.doc.htm ,last visited  10 January 2014. 
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…. if it turns out that the reasons relied on by the competent European Union 
authority do indeed preclude the disclosure to the person concerned of 
information or evidence produced before the Courts of the European Union, it is 
necessary to strike an appropriate balance between the requirements attached to 
the right to effective judicial protection in particular respect for the principle of an 
adversarial process, and those flowing from the security of the European Union or 
its Member States or the conduct of their international relations. In order to strike 
such a balance, it is legitimate to consider possibilities such as the disclosure of a 
summary outlining the information’s content or that of the evidence in question.  
Irrespective of whether such possibilities are taken, it is for the Courts of the 
European Union to assess whether and to what extent the failure to disclose 
confidential information or evidence to the person concerned and his 
consequential inability to submit his observations on them are such as to affect the 
probative value of the confidential evidence.57 
The judicial review which is, according to the Grand Chamber ‘indispensable to 
ensure a fair balance between the maintenance of international peace and 
security and the protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
person concerned … those being shared values of the UN and the European 
Union’58 is not, after all, the same as guaranteed rights, to evidence, to be 
heard, to the other side to be put to proof, to open justice, etc. Time will tell 
whether what the European courts are truly after is proper adversarial 
engagement or merely a central role for the judges in its savage dilution: or, to 
put it in another way (albeit crudely), ‘we can’t bear restrictions on due 
process – unless it is ourselves who decide it has to be that way.’59   
 
SECURING JUSTICE: BEYOND GOOD MANNERS 
However the cases turn out, nothing should detract from the European Court’s 
willingness to make itself awkward, well beyond the bounds of normal judicial 
good manners. The turn to law (and its sibling necessity, ‘the protection of 
fundamental human rights’) has become such a strong feature of liberal legal 
systems in recent decades that whole areas of state activity  previously safely 
outwith its reach have found themselves being dragged into the public space in 
order for their practitioners to be forced to provide legal accountability for 
                                                          
57
  Kadi II, supra  n.  7, paras. 128 and 129 (citations omitted). 
58
  Ibid, para. 131. 
59
  Cf Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] A.C. 206.  
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their actions.  The change has been particularly acute in the common law 
jurisdictions which have traditionally allowed prerogative power a clean run.  
This stopped after Watergate in the United States,60 and a decade or so later in 
the United Kingdom, under the influence of the European Convention on 
Human Rights with its insistence on interferences with rights needing to be 
‘prescribed by’ or ‘in accordance with’ law.61  In the immediate aftermath of 
the 11 September attacks, the then US president George W Bush sought to use 
the need for a strong reaction to these atrocities to return to a ‘commander-in-
chief’ model of the United States constitution, with executive power restored 
to the lead-role in all security matters: this was unsuccessful.62 The United 
Nations blacklisting regime went down the same route, but as we have seen 
has also been forced to modify the unaccountable nature of its decision-
making apparatus, at least to some degree, with in particular the 
Ombudsperson now increasingly flexing her muscles.63 The European 
statemodel was more subtle from the start, eschewing the kind of extreme 
governmental powers that would raise issues of principle related to the ‘rule of 
law’ and going instead for broadly-based, state-empowering but nevertheless 
technically legitimate legislative sanction. This explains, for example, the 
mystified response of security officials to the alleged illegality of UK 
intelligence conduct revealed by Edward Snowden, along the lines of ‘what we 
were doing was legal; why there was even a drop-down box on every 
computer where our operatives could confirm the compatibility of what they 
were doing with the UK Human Rights Act’.64 
We live in a ‘neo-democratic’ state when the appearance of general 
rules and universal protection of human rights is designed to hide (or at best to 
                                                          
60
  United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
Activities (theChurch Committee, 1975-76) http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/churchcommittee.html , 
visited 14 January 2014. The final report is at https://archive.org/details/finalreportofsel06unit , visited 14 
January 2014. 
61
  See Malone v United Kingdom (1984) 7 E.H.R.R. 14. 
62
  D. Cole, ‘The End of the War on Terror?’New York Review of Books 7 November 2013. 
(http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/nov/07/end-war-terror/?pagination=false (pay protected), 
visited 14 January 2014). 
63
  See Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson pursuant to Security Council resolution 2083 (2012) UN 
SC/2013/452: 
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65
BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/S_2013_452.pdf, visited 12 January 2014. 
64
  See the debate between C. Huhne (‘An Affront to Liberty’) and D. Omand and K Tebbit, (‘In Defence of 
GCHQ’) in Prospect, December 2013, p. 32-37. 
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obscure) a reality in which certain categories of persons (foreigners; suspected 
terrorists) form a discrete ‘suspect community’65 to whom the normal rules do 
not apply. We – the kind of people who read articles like this, who lead normal 
majoritarian lives, who do not rock any boats – are safe and if things go wrong 
we have our rights to hand to help us. Meanwhile, the others can be stopped, 
their property can be controlled, their liberty taken away, their movement 
restricted, their businesses ruined, their family life inhibited or destroyed, and 
all without any kind of criminal charge being made against them. Instead they 
are made victims of an administrative process which replaces the honesty of 
an open trial and (in the common law world) a jury with special advocates, 
commissions applying special rules, secret hearings, sympathetic 
ombudspersons on the periphery of the action, and constantly repeated but 
vague and unrefutable insinuations of guilt in the place of hard evidence.  If 
this is the way liberal democracy is drifting then the Grand Chamber is right to 
have nothing to do with it. As a tribunal rooted not in any national interest but 
in the fact of the primacy of law, it can hardly collude in the reduction of its 
rasion d’etre to a charade.  Good luck to it in the battles that lie ahead – long 
may in keep its nerve.  
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